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Abstract 
 
The ‘Scientific Development Concept’, promulgated by Hu Jintao in 2007 
articulated the increased eminence of social development in official ideology. 
The shift from political and economic objectives towards social factors can be 
explained by growing concerns over the current negative externalities of China’s 
economic growth, the long and midterm sustainability of its economic 
development model and the implications thereof for social stability and political 
legitimacy. An immediate priority has been to formulate and implement a 
response to mitigate the disruptive effects of the transition to a market 
economy. Such a response must cover a wide array of social issues, ranging 
from provision of health, education and infrastructure, pension to unemployment 
insurance and poverty alleviation. The welfare issue is characterized by high 
degrees of complexity and interdependency between endogenous factors and 
exogenous political and economic variables. Improvements are further 
confounded by the high decentralization of administration, regional disparities 
and the sheer size of operations. Although progress has been made on most 
fronts, it remains to be seen whether recent initiatives will prove sufficient to 
meet China’s social challenges. In this paper, I provide a summary of the 
academic literature on post-reform development of the welfare system. I will 
give an overview of its most salient problems, initiatives and their preliminary 
outcomes. Finally, I will present some concluding remarks and provide 
suggestions for future research. 
 
Keywords: China, Social Welfare, Economic Transition, Rural-Urban 
Dichotomy, Equality.   
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Introduction 
Social welfare in the broad sense pertains to all institutions, official and 
informal, that contribute to the wellbeing of a designated group of people. It 
includes a wide variety of social, economic, political and environmental factors 
and is subject to diverging interpretations. This study is limited to the narrow 
definition of social welfare which focuses on securing a ubiquitous standard of 
living with respect to physiological needs and social equity. This definition 
generally includes access to health care, education, infrastructure and a social 
safety net. In addition, in nations with a market economy, it includes some type 
of provision for retirees and the unemployed. It is generally presupposed that 
the state is responsible for the financing and administering of these services to 
a certain extent. During six decades of CCP rule, the organization of welfare in 
China has undergone tremendous change. These changes were brought about 
–partially inadvertently- with the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 
the late seventies, and signified a profound change in the CCP’s thinking about 
issues of equality and efficiency and its relationship to society. As a result of the 
marketisation and decentralization of the economy, much of the fabric of the 
communist welfare system came undone. Moreover, these developments 
increased existing disparities between regions and the cities and countryside 
and introduced new ones. However, to a large extent, the issues that hamper 
the establishment of a functional and holistic welfare system are a legacy of the 
pre-reform era. Therefore, it is instructive to first shortly review the welfare 
system under communist rule. 
 
Welfare in China 1949-1978 
Under the planned economy, access to welfare was explicitly linked to 
employment, or more specifically, the work unit (danwei). A strict division 
between countryside and city, maintained through the household registration 
system (hukou), allowed for the implementation of a generous urban welfare 
program. Pensions for employees of SOEs were well in excess of 60 percent 
(Frazier 2004; James 2001). By contrast, the greatest contribution of the state in 
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the countryside consisted of the abolition of feudal arrangements through the 
establishment of a collective farming system (Chang 2003). Other than that, the 
state propagated a residual and self-reliance welfare strategy for the 
countryside. At its inception in 1950, the welfare program covered just about a 
tenth of the industrial workforce, but rapidly expanded to include over three 
quarters of urban wage earners by the late seventies (Selden and You 1997). 
The responsibility of funding lay with enterprise management. The larger portion 
of contributions was allocated to enterprise trade unions, and designated for the 
financing of pensions and subsidies. The remaining portion was pooled, and 
redistributed among enterprises with varying levels of performance (ibid). 
Welfare was extensive, comprising pensions as well as health, housing, 
canteens and education. The retirement age was sixty for men and fifty for 
women (Frazier 2004). Pension payments were about half to three quarters of 
wage upon retirement. By the late seventies the welfare coverage had 
increased to about 78% of urban wage earners, an impressive feat for a 
developing nation. However, since the majority of the population was still 
engaged in agriculture, those receiving welfare still amounted to only 19% of the 
total labor force (Selden and You 1997). Moreover, the quality and availability of 
welfare benefits differed substantially, depending on individual rank and 
enterprise ownership and size. Due notice ought to be given to such caveats 
when comparing the communist era and post-reform welfare systems. 
Nonetheless, the CCP managed to make significant advancements along a 
number of dimensions of wellbeing. Under communist rule, China had one of 
the world’s lowest gini coefficients (Wong 2002). Comprehensive health 
campaigns and improvements in sanitation and water supply greatly reduced 
the prevalence of infectious diseases, lowered infant mortality and increased life 
expectancy (Dummer and Cook 2007). Marked progress was also made in 
decreasing illiteracy and expanding access to basic education. Whatever the 
merits of communist-era welfare, the system proved inherently incompatible 
with the focus on economic efficiency, which became the overriding principle in 
post-Mao China. The subsequent section will describe the new social 
challenges brought about by the transition to a market economy. 
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The consequences of economic reform to China’s welfare system 
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China abandoned the notion of 
continuous revolution in order to pursue ‘Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’. The development of China after 1978 has been characterized 
by both continued high economic growth, and increasing socio-economic 
disparity. To an extent, this disparity might be an inevitable byproduct of 
industrialization. However, this disparity is also a direct result of pre-reform 
social economic arrangements and new preferential state policies.  Economic 
development has had equivocal effects across regions and the various 
elements of social welfare. Nonetheless, it is possible to make some general 
observations. 
First, the economic development of China has not been homogenous. In 
broad terms, one can make a division between the coastal provinces in the east 
and the western region. According to official statistics, household expenditure is 
2.4 times higher in the east than in the west (2007 est.). In recent years, the 
government has made western development an issue of strategic priority (Lin 
and Chen 2004; Tian 2004). Nevertheless, indications of the effectiveness of 
these initiatives are equivocal (ibid). A variety of factors contribute to the 
disadvantaged economic position of the west: 
 
The geography of the west  
The western provinces make up 71.5 percent of the total area of China, 
yet comprises only 28 percent of China’s population (China statistical yearbook 
2008). The large degree of dispersion of the population hampers initiatives to 
promote economic and social development of the area. Moreover, much of the 
western area is composed of mountainous terrain. Only 27.6 percent of arable 
land is located in the west (ibid). Although the West possesses considerable 
natural resources, these remain unexploited due to their inaccessibility and 
remoteness to the industrialized areas (Lin and Chen 2004). 
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Discriminate economic policy 
Since 1978, a host of government initiatives has contributed to a more 
rapid development of the economy of the coastal provinces. These policies 
include the establishment of special economic zones, the facilitation of FDI, 
government investments in infrastructure and the business sector. Tax 
exemptions for the coastal provinces decreased central revenues, which in turn 
translated into less investment in the west (Lin and Chen 2004).Industrial 
restructuring has been decisively more progressive in the east. The West still 
has a decisively higher proportion of SOEs, which tend to be much less efficient 
than their private counterparts. Moreover, the industrial infrastructure in the 
western region is comparatively outdated. 
 
Market transformations 
Because of the higher efficiency and rate of return of the coastal 
economy, low priced natural resources flow from West to East. The West in turn 
purchases high value processed manufacturing goods. Similarly, skilled 
laborers tend to migrate to the coastal area where wages are higher and there 
are more opportunities (OECD 2004). Therefore, market forces naturally 
exacerbate the disparity between regions. 
  A second division can be made between urban and rural areas. 
Estimates of the ratio of rural to urban income range from one third to one sixth, 
depending on whether urban welfare benefits are taken into account (OECD 
2004). An important determinant of the persistent and increasing (ibid) disparity 
between cities and countryside is the dual welfare system. From the outset, 
China’s welfare system focused on the support of urban residents (Selden and 
You 1997). The development of the post-reform welfare system was 
characterized by a further retrenchment of the central government on rural 
welfare services. The rural collectives were replaced by the household 
responsibility system, which increased farmers’ revenues (OECD 2006a), but 
also compromised rural welfare infrastructure. After 1978 the TVEs took over 
many of the welfare services earlier provided by the collective. However, 
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increased competition with coastal industry in the 90’s caused many TVEs to go 
bankrupt or renege on their welfare provisions (OECD 2006a).  
Ruralities have responded in various ways to the lack of supply of welfare 
services. The state has reemphasized the principle of self-reliance (Hebel 
2003). To a large extent access to support is delineated along genealogical 
lines. However, demographic changes have limited the extent to which the 
family can substitute for formal welfare institutions (Zhang 2002). Moreover, 
organization based on kinship ties excludes several of the most vulnerable 
groups of the population, such as childless elderly and orphans (Zhang 2002; 
Shang et al 2005). Recently, the state has taken a more active interest in rural 
welfare, notably by introduction of a trial rural pension system (Xinhua 2009). 
However, as this project is but in an embryonic stage, little can be said about its 
contribution to rural wellbeing. The vast size of the rural population has deterred 
the state from taking any comprehensive actions in establishing a rural welfare 
system up until now. 
Paradoxically, the urban-rural divide has been perpetuated in the cities. 
This is because the relaxation of restrictions on migration has not been matched 
with a relaxation of the household registration (hukou) system. The vast majority 
of migrant workers are not eligible for urban residency, which prohibits them 
from making any claims on the urban welfare system. Because of their marginal 
status, migrant workers are generally restricted to risky, low-paying and 
physically demanding labor (Liu and Wu 2006, OECD 2006a). Observers note 
that many migrant workers retain their farming plots to substitute for social 
security. This in effect hinders the efficient allocation and use of scarce farm 
land and undermines the viability of the agricultural economy (ibid). 
A third divide runs along ownership structures. China’s welfare system 
systematically emphasizes the rights of public sector employees over those of 
non-state workers (Saunders and Shang 2001). This is by and large due to the 
legacy of the centrally planned economy, under which welfare provision was the 
responsibility of the work unit (danwei). The practice of tying access to welfare 
to public employment was perpetuated during the economic transition. 
Developments in the SOEs and social welfare policies introduced since the 
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nineties have mitigated the duality of the urban rural welfare system. Mounting 
concerns over the poor performance of SOEs and the excessive burden of 
welfare obligations led the state to initiate a rigorous restructuring of the public 
sector. The practice of providing lifetime employment was terminated in 1986 
(Wong 2002). Under Jiang Zemin, the majority of small and medium sized 
SOEs were disbanded, and the SOE workforce was downsized by some forty 
percent between 1995 and 2000 (Giles et al. 2006). Under the new xiagang 
arrangement, laid-off worker’s social benefits were limited to three years of 
basic living subsidies, health care and pension contributions (ibid). In 
concurrence with the reduction in public welfare, the state made efforts to 
expand welfare coverage to include the other sectors of the urban economy. 
The three-pillar pension system was promulgated in 1991 (Yu 2007). In 1999, 
the state introduced universal urban unemployment insurance. Both initiatives 
(nominally) included the private sector (Giles et al 2007). However, non-
compliance rates for both programs are high (Yu 2007). Although the scope of 
welfare has increased, the link between contract employment and access to 
welfare persists (Liu and Wu 2006). The public-private dichotomy has become 
more permeable, but institutional and economic obstacles to both a more 
equitable welfare system and greater economic efficiency remain. The welfare 
system continues to favor the relatively well-off (OECD 2004). Labor mobility 
between the public and private sector is constrained because most welfare 
benefits are non-transferable. Also, reorganization of the public industry has 
given rise to new social economic issues, such as urban unemployment. 
A fourth general observation can be made in regards to the shifting 
responsibilities of the central state, localities, enterprises and individuals. 
Devolution of responsibilities has been taking place both in the funding and the 
administration of welfare (Wong 1994; Wong 2002; Guo 2003; Dummer and 
Cook 2007). The devolution of the funding of welfare services was a 
consequence of the economic and fiscal decentralization initiated in the late 
seventies. Because of these reforms, central government’s share of GNP 
declined drastically, and deficits accrued (Wong 1994). The 1985 Joint Circular 
rendered local authorities responsible for the financing of welfare services. The 
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intent of central government was to limit its role to that of regulator and 
supervisor (Mok 2005,) focusing instead on the establishment of a social safety 
net (Liu and Wu 2006) and assistance to selected regions (Gustafsson and 
Zhong 2000; Tian 2004). In theory, decentralization ought to improve the 
responsiveness to local circumstances, and thereby, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of public spending (OECD 2006). However, empirical evidence paints 
a less encouraging picture. As local governments aren’t responsible to an 
electorate, there remains a significant risk of misallocation of available funds. 
Perhaps a more salient issue is that the increased responsibilities of local 
governments have not been met by a corresponding increase in revenues. 
Moreover, local governments have limited discretion to increase revenues 
through taxes or levies. In order to cope with structural shortages, many local 
authorities engage in dysfunctional and/ or illegal practices, or renege on their 
duties altogether (ibid). A concurrent development is the increasing privatization 
of welfare services. The lack of public funding has placed greater demands on 
both welfare institutions and individuals. Fees for healthcare and education 
have been rising steadily (Wong 2002; Bai 2006; Hannum and Wang 2006). In 
consequence, access to welfare services has become increasingly contingent 
on individuals’ ability to pay for them (Wong 2002).  
Problems also persist on the central level. The reorientation of central 
government and intended retrenchment is undermined by the size and 
inefficiencies of the administrative apparatus, which is characterized by high 
levels of overlap and redundancy (OECD 2006b). This impedes attempts to 
lower expenditures and improve transparency and accountability. Moreover, 
state expenditure is unbalanced; while spending on key areas such as 
education is already low by international standards (ibid), a disproportionate 
part of government budget is allocated to salaries for administrative personnel. 
Initiatives aimed at downsizing and reorganizing the state bureaucracy have 
been under way since the late nineties (Brødsgaard 2002).  Nonetheless, the 
pervasiveness of the state remains an impediment to the envisioned 
restructuring of central-local relations. 
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At the same time, decentralization and a top-down structure have impaired the 
effectiveness of central efforts to alleviate poverty. Earmarked funds for poverty 
alleviation are distributed according to regional and ethnic criteria rather than on 
a need basis. This gives rise to both problems of undercoverage and leakage 
(Gustafsson and Zhang 2000). Weakened central local ties also give rise to 
agency issues. Recent efforts to ensure a basic level of subsistence such as the 
Minimum Life Security system (MLS) employ more relevant criteria and have 
accordingly achieved better results. However, coverage is still insufficient (Liu 
and Wu 2006). 
The above issues are by and large symptoms of an archaic state 
structure, and confound developments across the whole spectrum welfare 
service. General improvements in government organization and administration 
ought to significantly alleviate these problems. Yet a multitude of issues 
particular to specific welfare services remain. The subsequent section will 
expound the developments and challenges related to the main constituents of 
the Chinese welfare system. 
 
Unemployment 
Although unemployment is a phenomenon concomitant with the market 
economy, there is a general consensus that unemployment constitutes a 
sizeable and serious problem in China. Employment in the state-owned sector 
alone fell by 40% between 1995 and 2000 (Giles et al 2006). However, no 
consensus exists when it comes to estimates of the number of unemployed. 
Obfuscation arises first from the official taxonomy employed by the government. 
The government distinguishes between furloughed (xiagang) and unemployed 
(shiye) workers. The former category is officially defined as those laid-off 
workers that started employment before the establishment of the contract 
system in 1986, have not yet officially terminated relations with their former 
employee and have not yet found other employment (Solinger 2001). It does not 
include furloughed from the collective sector. The predicate of unemployed on 
the other hand, only applies to workers from bankrupt firms. Naturally, official 
statistics do not include the floating population, nor do they take into account 
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the large group of ‘early retirees’ from the state firms. Problems are 
compounded by pragmatic issues such as underreporting by firms. The hidden 
unemployed retain their official association with the firm, but receive reduced or 
no pay (ibid). This allows enterprises to refrain from dispensing unemployment 
benefits. Due to the above factors, the extent of unemployment is anybody’s 
guess. What is obvious is that the official figure (4.0% in 2007, China Statistical 
Yearbook 2008) is structurally deflated. 
For the higher skilled and younger workers, the release from the SOEs 
has been a welcome change, as it allows them to pursue better opportunities in 
the private sector (Solinger 2002). For most discharged SOE workers, the 
redistributive function of the free market has proven inadequate.  
Far from being a mere taxonomical exercise, the government’s overly strict 
classifications deny benefits to many of the jobless (Solinger 2001). Under the 
xiagang arrangement introduced in 1993, laid-off workers were entitled to three 
years of basic living subsidies, health care and pension contributions (Giles et al 
2006) as well as reemployment service. Funding came from a combination of 
central and local budgetary expenditures as well as enterprise contributions. 
The SOEs were responsible for establishing and running re-employment 
centers. The xiagang arrangements were designed as a temporary mechanism 
to facilitate the restructuring of the overburdened state owned sector. However, 
it soon became clear that they fell short of achieving this objective. Less than 
half of the workers considering themselves to fall into the xiagang category 
received formal certificates. And even then, the majority of the select group 
holding formal proof of their furloughed status didn’t receive the benefits they 
were entitled to. Leakage is also a problem, with some 17% of workers 
receiving both unemployment and xiagang benefits, and 20% receiving these 
benefits while working (ibid). Results from the reemployment centers were no 
more encouraging. According to Giles et al (2006) a survey held between 1996 
and 2001 indicated only 29% of the discharged were reemployed within a year.    
In response to the unsatisfactory performance of the xiagang arrangements, the 
government introduced its unemployment insurance program in 1999. This 
program has -nominally- extended coverage to all urban workers. Funding is 
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secured through a diversified scheme that includes state, enterprise and 
individual contributions. Local authorities have the prerogative to determine the 
duration and size of the assistance (Vodopivec et al 2008). The unemployment 
insurance abrogated the relation between the furloughed and their former 
employers. No more reemployment centers were established after 2001 and as 
of 2005 the number of people registered in such centers equaled a mere 3% of 
the seven million enrolled in 1991 (ibid). 
The minimum living security program was established in 1998 (MLS) to 
complement unemployment insurance. The former is an attempt to improve 
coverage and consolidate insurance funding and administration. The MLS isn’t 
directly targeted at the unemployed, but rather intended to provide people with a 
minimum level of subsistence. However, since many unemployed are ineligible 
for insurance, they compromise a large part of MLS recipients. Although the 
reorganization has expanded the scope of unemployment assistance and 
diversified its distribution, the system retains most of the flaws associated with 
the earlier arrangements. In lack of effective regulation, supervision and 
enforcement mechanisms, problems pertaining to under-coverage, leakage and 
unequal access abound (ibid).   
  
Pension 
Pension reform has been a focal point for the government because 
pensions comprise a major part of central and local government welfare 
expenditure. The pre-reform pension system was inextricably interlocked with 
the central planning economy. Headway has been made in reorganizing the 
pension system in accordance with economic transition, but the liabilities of the 
old system carry on into the present. Moreover, due to demographic changes, 
these liabilities will greatly increase in the future (West 1999).  
Under pre-reform arrangements, pension administration was the duty of 
the state enterprise. SOE revenues formed the basis for pension funding. 
Arrangements were generous by all standards. The allowances dispensed upon 
retirement averaged well over sixty percent (Selden and You 1997) and actually 
increased in subsequent years to seventy-five because of adjustments made in 
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accordance with macro-economic indicators (James 2001). The retirement age 
was set at sixty for men and fifty-five for women (ibid). The low average age of 
China’s population at the inception of communist rule deferred the costs of such 
lenient policies (Selden and You 2001), and allowed for a pay as you go funding 
arrangement. Moreover, enterprises had little incentive to be parsimonious 
while the state ultimately had to bear the costs of pension arrangements (James 
2001). Indeed significant problems did not arise until the reforms of 1978. The 
push for greater efficiency instigated prevalent downsizing of the SOE 
workforce. To curb unemployment, the government used various incentives to 
motivate workers to retire early. Because of the growing number of retirees, 
providing funding for pensions became an excessive burden for many collective 
enterprises (ibid).  In consequence, the employee to retiree ratio swiftly fell, to 
below five to one in 1995 (Selden and You 1997). 
The pressure for reform was intensified by continuous protests by SOE 
retirees who had not received their pensions or experienced arrears (Hurst and 
O’Brien 2002). The right to pensions is seen as an inextricable and enduring 
component of the social contract between these former SOE workers and the 
communist state (ibid). It is important to note that, while the old pension system 
engendered significant financial problems, it still excluded the private sector and 
the rural population. 
Pension reform thus had to address several issues. First, it had to deal 
with the rising disparity between pension costs and contributions, as well as the 
discrepancy between needs and resources. Second, in order to improve the 
mobility between the public and private sector, it had to abolish the link between 
SOEs and pension provision. Third, it needed to extend coverage beyond the 
borders of the publicly owned industry. The Chinese government has 
responded to this challenge in an incremental fashion. 
In 1986, the lifetime employment policy was replaced by a contract based 
one, relieving SOEs of some of their welfare obligations (Selden and You 1997). 
Experimentation with consolidated funds started in the same year, when the 
state council encouraged the pooling of pension funds at the municipal level. 
This increased the size of the funding pool and improved labor mobility within 
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the municipality. However, pooling arrangements did not address insolvency 
issues, and many municipalities ran structural deficits. Moreover, local 
authorities often lacked the skills and capacity to administer the social security 
system, so that enterprises remained responsible for the bulk of pension 
administration. With financing obligations lying with the municipality and 
administration being carried out by the enterprises, the original agency 
problems persisted. Non-compliancy and under provision to municipal funds 
were common practice (ibid). Another problem was that municipal level 
arrangements still had limited redistributive capacity (James 2001). 
In 1991, the state promulgated the three-pillar system. The new system 
was bolstered by the introduction of the basic old age insurance in 1997. The 
central features of this scheme were a diversification of pension funding and a 
higher degree of consolidation. In the new system, funding responsibilities are 
shared between the individual, enterprise and the central state. Proceeds are 
divided between a pay-as-you go, non-contributory state pension and fully 
funded privately managed pillar and augmented by voluntary individual savings 
(Yu 2007). This system expanded welfare policy to the private industry and 
consolidated proceeds at the provincial level. Rural enterprises were still 
excluded. Moreover, because the new system was not accompanied by 
structural improvements in supervision, non-compliance remained a salient 
issue (James 2001). Reluctance to contribute to the new system partly 
originated out of prevalent concerns about poor management of public funds 
(Selden and You 1997).  More generally, many workers may feel that having to 
shoulder both current and future pension obligations is excessive and undue. 
The new system gave significant discretion to local governments in deciding 
contribution rates and the level of subsistence provided by the pensions. Many 
local authorities were struggling with structural deficits and thus decided to 
devolve the brunt of financial responsibilities to individuals (Selden and You 
1997). In 2000, the national social security fund (NSSF) was established. The 
fund is intended to help meet future pension obligations and supplement the 
basic old age insurance system. The NSSF is characterized by comparatively 
high standards of management and governance, and has performed 
14 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2010 - 32  
accordingly (Impavido et al 2009).The NSSF started investments in SOE 
shares, private equities and overseas markets by 2001, with an average return 
of 8.98% for the period 2001-2008 (NSSF website). However, assessments of 
the NSSF’s performance are complicated by the fact that its objectives are not 
linked to future pension expenditure estimates. 
Overall, significant advancements have been made in pension reform. 
Pension coverage, in the shape of either basic old age insurance, rural 
pensions or minimum life security has increased to 40% of the labor force 
(Impavido et al 2009). The new system is characterized by a higher degree of 
consolidation, improving both labor mobility and the capacity for inter-regional 
transfers. The multi-pillar system mitigates the imbalance between expenditure 
and revenue. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether these improvements 
will prove sufficient to meet extant and future challenges. If replacement rates 
are not lowered and retirement age increased, liabilities may well surpass the 
government’s financial capabilities (James 2001). Nonetheless, the pension 
scheme will have to eventually incorporate the rural population. Pension 
administration still suffers from high levels of fragmentation and discretion which 
leads to low levels of transparency and accountability. The effectiveness of the 
system is further confounded by a lack of supervision and adequate 
enforcement mechanisms. Solutions will have to be implemented swiftly in order 
to provide an adequate response to the looming pension crisis brought about by 
an ageing population.       
 
Healthcare 
In the communist era, health services were provided by means of a dual 
system. A multi-tier system existed in rural areas. At the village level, bare-foot 
doctors provided basic health care. Subsequent tiers provided referral and 
specialist services and were responsible for the supervision and coordination of 
the subordinate levels. These services were supplemented by nationwide 
preventive and health awareness campaigns (Bloom and Gu 1997). In cities, 
healthcare was provided through government run health care facilities. 
Employees in the government or academic sector and military personnel, 
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including veterans were covered by a public insurance scheme. Labor 
insurance was available to SOE workers, and to a smaller extent, laborers in 
collective enterprises. Combined, the two programs covered about three 
quarters of the urban labor force in the late seventies (Guo 2003). During the 
three decades of communist rule, average life expectancy increased from 39 to 
69 (Bloom and Gu 1997). In the same period infant mortality dropped from 17 to 
5.2% (UNdata 2009). Many of the endemic infectious and parasitic diseases 
were successfully combated. 
Notwithstanding the advances made in public health, the system also 
had its drawbacks. Problems compounded in the wake of the market reforms. 
Free provision of urban health care led to rampant over-utilization. With no 
effective cost controlling mechanisms in place, expenditures increased twenty-
eight fold in the period 1978-97 (Guo 2003). Cost containment strategies 
centered on the privatization and marketisation of health care. Fee charging for 
medical services commenced in the nineteen-eighties and has become 
ubiquitous since then. The devolution of financing responsibilities from the state 
to the individual has curbed over-utilization. On the other hand, access to 
health-care is now increasingly contingent on individual financial resources, and 
medical fees have deterred poor individuals from seeking health care (Wang 
2002; Guo 2003). The results of marketisation have also been ambivalent. 
Institutions and doctors now have to vie for contracts and clients. The 
proliferation of the private health care industry has given consumers greater 
discretion in selecting services. Public bidding mechanisms and a division 
between hospitals and pharmacies have been installed in 2000 to decrease 
drug costs. However, proceeds from medicine constituted a major portion of 
health care providers’ revenues. These institutions thus have to increasingly 
rely on revenue from medical fees. As such, efficiency gains from privatization 
have not resulted in lower consumer costs.  
Another issue was that the pre-reform arrangements, where access to 
healthcare was linked to industrial categorization didn’t correspond with the new 
market situation. This led to a reversal of the pre-reform advances made in 
health insurance coverage. The impetus to address this structural imbalance 
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was provided in a resolution by the central committee in 1993. Health care 
insurance was decoupled from the enterprise and came under the auspices of 
local authorities. Funding was to be derived from individual and enterprise 
contributions. In 1998, requirements pertaining to basic health care insurance 
(BHCI) were adjusted to include all urban residents, save for the self-employed 
(Guo 2003). However, implementation has been cumbersome. Xu et al (2007) 
note that, although participation in BCHI grew ahead of official targets, urban 
health insurance coverage actually declined between 1998 and 2003. This is 
primarily due to the diminishing importance of enterprise based arrangements. 
However, the endurance of the government and labor insurance system 
obstruct the transition to a unified health insurance scheme. Moreover, 
coverage is still linked to employment, which gives rise to unequal coverage of 
genders age cohorts and income groups (ibid).  
In the countryside, developments have been less ambiguous. Following 
the marketisation of health care services and the dismantling of the Cooperative 
Medical System, the increased financial burden on personal income prohibits 
many of the rural poor to seek medical treatment(Dummer and Cook 2007). In 
2002 the government reinstated the community based health insurance. 
However, the related costs undermine rural residents’ willingness to participate 
in such schemes (Zhang et al 2005). Although the ruralities still have a relatively 
proficient health care infrastructure, there is tendency towards urban 
concentration of health care facilities and expertise. A lack of central control and 
administration and a lack of economic incentive have also brought about a 
decline in the provision of preventive health services and awareness 
campaigns. As such, China has seen the reemergence of epidemic diseases 
which were virtually absent during communist rule (Dummer and Cook 2007). 
From the above, it may be clear that decentralization and marketisation alone 
cannot solve China’s health problems.  
Education 
Since the economic reforms, clear advancements have been made in the 
area of education. The illiteracy rate steadily decreased from 31.9 to 8.4 percent 
in the period 1981-2007 (China Statistical Yearbook 1981, 2008). Gross 
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enrolment rates for primary and secondary education also increased between 
1980 and 2005 from respectively 88 and 73 percent to 99 and 101 percent 
(UNESCO 2008). However, government expenditure as a proportion of GDP is 
low at 2.5 percent (2002 est., OECD 2006b), which includes both operating and 
infrastructure expenses. Even more so than other welfare services, education is 
characterized by a high degree of privatization and decentralization. The 
reduced role of the state has negatively affected the availability and quality of 
education (Bai 2006). The devolution of financial responsibility from the central 
government to local authorities and educational institutes has resulted in the 
proliferation of tuition and other fees. From 1990 to 1998, average tuition more 
than tripled (Hannum and Wang 2006). The increased importance of personal 
finance has created an imbalance of access to education in poorer and more 
affluent regions (OECD 2006a; Hannum and Wang 2006; Guo 2007). This is 
worrisome, because the difference in human capital between the coastal and 
inland provinces has been cited as an important determinant of the economic 
disparity. The government has tried to address the inequity of access to 
education through a variety of initiatives. The 2001 tax for fee reform replaced 
local taxes and levies on rural households with a centralized agricultural tax. 
This has alleviated demands on farmers’ wages, but has also significantly 
impaired the ability of local governments to raise revenue (Guo 2007). Because 
the increase in central revenue was not balanced by a proportionate increase in 
central spending responsibilities, the problem of financial inadequacy was not 
solved but merely transferred from the individual to the township level. 
Therefore, the government announced in 2006 that it would waive tuition fees 
for the nine years of compulsory schooling for some 150 million rural children 
(Xinhua 2006).  
Indiscriminately increasing the state spending on education might 
however not be an adequate or sustainable solution to the problems of the 
educational sector. First, government initiatives are diluted by administrative 
inefficiencies. A disproportionate amount within the budget for education is 
allotted to non-teaching staff (OECD 2006b). A second factor hampering the 
development of an egalitarian education system through government spending 
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is a structural prioritization of higher education. In 1999, the Chinese 
government initialized a series of reforms aimed at transforming the educational 
system to accommodate “mass higher education”. This move was in part 
motivated by a concern over long-term competitiveness of the Chinese 
economy. Nevertheless, the immediate motivation was to boost domestic 
consumption, and deflect the issue of high school graduate unemployment. The 
speed with which this transformation was realized allowed the government to 
reach its target of a 15 percent enrolment rate in higher education well ahead of 
schedule, but also caused significant quality, funding and organizational 
problems (Bai 2006). A related problem is that the development of human 
capital doesn’t coincide with geographic and market demand. In the state-led 
push for higher education, emphasis lay on rapidly increasing the scale of 
universities. Therefore, these institutes did not have time to adjust their curricula 
to market demands. The discrepancy between education and required skills is a 
main cause of graduate unemployment (ibid). Moreover, human capital 
accumulates in the coastal cities, were most high quality educational institutions 
are situated. The imbalance of human capital is intensified by the outflow of 
educated workers from the countryside to the coastal cities, where wages are 
higher. 
Given the limited capacity of townships to address these issues, further 
improvement of the educational system will thus to a large extent be contingent 
on the efforts of central government. The state should not only take on a more 
active role in the provision and allocation of funding, but also promote the 
quality and efficiency of education through supervision and by ensuring that the 
supply of education corresponds to local needs. Centrally promulgated, nation-
wide targets will have to be replaced with more heterogenic objectives based on 
the diversity of needs and situations in the various regions. This will require that 
the decentralization and privatization that have characterized the educational 
system after the reforms will have to be reversed to an extent.  
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Poverty alleviation and Western development 
According to official statistics, (based on a daily income of only 
USD$0.66, OECD 2004), rural poverty has rapidly dwindled from 250 million in 
1978 to 32 million in 2000 (OECD 2006b), or about 4 percent of the rural 
population (China Statistical Yearbook 2000). More conservative figures by the 
World Bank (based on a USD$ 1.00 poverty line by PPP) put the number 
considerably higher at 11.5 percent (2000 est., ADB 2004), but nonetheless 
depict an impressive decline in the number of rural poor in the last decades.  
Notwithstanding the impressive advances made in rural poverty alleviation, 
results ought to be interpreted with a degree of caution. For the most part, 
households’ financial situation was merely raised to a level where exogenous 
economic shocks, such as natural disaster or illness would instantly hurl them 
back into poverty. Moreover, the increases in income allow households to 
ensure their subsistence, but provide no slack for investments in capital or 
education, which could structurally improve their economic status (OECD 
2006a). The extent of urban poverty is decisively harder to estimate.  This is 
because there is no official urban poverty line. Poverty lines are determined 
independently by each city, and in consequence vary considerably according to 
local economic conditions (ADB 2004). The National Bureau of Statistics 
estimated that in 2001, some 10.1 million or 3.1% of registered urban citizens 
lived in poverty (ibid). The actual figure is significantly higher, because the NBS 
estimate does not include the floating population.  
The relationship between demographic factors and the likelihood of 
poverty is intuitive. Poor households are often larger and have more 
dependents (i.e. a greater ratio of non-working to employed household 
members(OECD2006b; Meng et al 2007). A low level of education also 
increases chances of being poor. A third categorization is geographic rather 
than demographic. The vast majority of China’s poor is located in the 
countryside and in the West (OECD 2006a). China’s urban poor population 
consists primarily of the floating population and unemployed and laid-off SOE 
workers (Liu and Wu 2006; Solinger 2007). In the cities, the minimum living 
security system (MLS) has been the primary vehicle for combating poverty. The 
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MLS was introduced in Shanghai in 1993 and consequently expanded to other 
cities. Local authorities are responsible for the administration of the system and 
deciding on the allocation and the height of stipends Shang and Wu 2004). In 
consequence, the criteria for eligibility varied widely from city to city, and many 
of the urban poor did not receive assistance (ibid). Therefore, the government 
focused on improving the criteria for allocation and removing many of the 
additional requirements and restrictions imposed by local governments. Now, 
income is the most important determinant for eligibility. However, MLS 
assistance still excludes the floating population, a major part of the urban poor. 
 As for the countryside, initiatives were primarily aimed at improving 
productivity and incentives of agriculture (such as the household responsibility 
system). These initiatives produced significant results, but became less useful 
when the prices of produce decreased as a consequence of market pressures 
(OECD 2006a). As such poverty alleviation has increasingly taken on the shape 
of central financial assistance. The government based allocation decisions for 
rural poverty alleviation programs on geographic criteria. Due to the dispersion 
of poor households, this gave rise to problems of under-coverage and leakage 
(Gustafsson and Zhong 2000; OECD 2004). Xu (2004) notes that significant 
disparity can exist between proximate townships with similar physical 
endowments. He cites entrepreneurship and political gaming by wealthier 
townships as reasons for such differences.  
Despite their shortcomings, geographic criteria continue to function as 
the main considerations on which central initiatives are based (ADB 2004). The 
Western development program (initiated in 1996) is a notable example. The 
structural and growing economic disparity between the West and the coastal 
provinces motivated a series of comprehensive initiatives in the shape of anti-
poverty programs, increased investment in infrastructure and education, as well 
as policies aimed at attracting investment from abroad and China’s East coast 
(Tian 2004). Results have been equivocal. While acknowledging the 
multifaceted nature of poverty, programs have overly relied on financial 
instruments, such as tax exemptions, financial assistance and industrial 
investment. Further advances in poverty alleviation will first require further 
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development of the rural economy (OECD 2004; ADB 2004). However, rural 
economic development is hampered by administrative obstacles. The most 
salient of these is the hukou system. Lifting the stringent restrictions of the 
hukou system is expected to aid in rural development in three ways. The flow of 
rural laborers to urban areas would increase productivity of labor in the 
agricultural sector. Remittances from migrant workers to their homes would 
provide rural households with additional income, which might be used to 
improve productivity in agriculture or rural industry. With the insecurities 
pertaining to legal status of migrant workers gone, the arable land market could 
function more efficiently, which would lead to a more optimal allocation of 
resources. This in turn provides farmers with the incentives to invest in goods 
that improve the productivity of newly acquired plots and allow them to profit 
from scale economies (OECD 2006b). Finally, given the heterogeneity of factors 
that give rise to poverty, greater coordination between local and central efforts 
is crucial. 
 
Marginalized groups 
It is self-evident that within the welfare system, special provisions ought 
to be made for the most vulnerable groups in society, that is, those who lack the 
ability to provide for themselves and cannot rely on the assistance of next of kin 
or the local community. Unfortunately, post-reform developments have brought 
about a decisive decline in welfare arrangements for these groups. After the 
dismantling of the commune system, rural welfare was characterized by a 
retrenchment of the state and an emphasis on self-reliance (Zhang 2002). In 
instances where the township government lacks the resources for setting up a 
welfare system, the responsibility for the provision of welfare services rests 
upon the community and the family in particular. The childless elderly are one 
group that has been especially adversely affected by this transition (ibid). As of 
yet they constitute a marginal portion of the Chinese population, but because of 
stringent birth control and the resultant imbalance in the male-female population 
ratio, this problem will likely become increasingly salient in the future. Questions 
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have also been raised as to the ability of current adolescents born under the 
one-child policy to provide for an ever growing group of elderly. 
A second marginalized group is comprised of abandoned (and often 
disabled) children, orphans and street children. Several hundred thousand 
children are estimated to fall in one or more of these categories. In urban areas, 
only orphans and abandoned children who have been registered under the 
urban household system are eligible for government support. The ‘five 
guarantees’ system (wubao) nominally also covers the orphaned and 
abandoned children. However, many of these children are ineligible for these 
services, which are only provided to recognized members of the community. In 
many cases, it is not possible to establish who the parents of these orphans and 
abandoned children were (Shang et al 2005). 
In the face of inadequate government provisions, voluntary organizations 
have emerged to try and fill the gaps in the social security net. However, these 
NGO’s cannot rely on the state for funding, lack legal status and organizational 
support and supervision by the state, and therefore care provided by these 
organizations is often inadequate (ibid). Given the demographic transitions and 
disparate effects of economic development, the state will need to assume a 
greater and more active role in the provision in welfare services for marginalized 
groups.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations for future research  
Since the reforms, economic efficiency has taken precedence over 
concerns about equity. Pre-reform China was poor but rather egalitarian. The 
remarkable economic development of China has engendered higher per capita 
incomes, but also a tremendous and growing divergence in wellbeing. Deng 
Xiaoping infamously proclaimed that it would not hurt to ‘let some people get 
rich first’. The consensus was that the initial economic disparity would be 
mitigated eventually by a ‘trickle down’ effect (Wong 2002). However, in China 
there is little evidence to support the endogenously stabilizing effect of the 
market economy. Concerns about the sustainability of China’s economic growth 
and its concomitant social effects have led the government to revise its 
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responsibilities in promoting equity and effectiveness.  Since the late nineties 
government spending has rapidly increased (OECD2006a). However, the effect 
of increased government spending is impaired by administrative obstacles and 
the absence of a comprehensive and consistent welfare strategy. As to the 
former, it will be crucial to reduce the duplication and overlap that exists in the 
current bureaucratic apparatus. This will decrease administrative expenses and 
mitigate the ambiguity concerning responsibilities. A step in the right direction 
has been taken with the centralization of funding and fiscal administration for 
many welfare services, but the role of the central state must not end there. 
Greater cooperation between local and central government is called for, and 
standardized mechanisms for monitoring and control will need to be 
established. A more unambiguous legal framework and more rigorous 
enforcement mechanisms need to be put into place to curb the problem of non-
compliance. Spending responsibilities need to be matched with corresponding 
allocation of revenue. The state will have to play a greater distributive role to 
ensure that poorer regions can meet welfare objectives. Eligibility criteria for 
welfare services have to be adjusted to reflect needs rather than professional or 
economic status. To further improve living standards, a comprehensive strategy 
needs to be formulated, which pays due attention to the interrelatedness and 
complexities of various welfare elements. Care needs to be given to avoid the 
promulgation of contradicting objectives. For example, it would be unrealistic to 
expect concurrent high investments in measures increasing short term 
economic growth and human capital. 
As such, it is clear that there is a large need for additional research on 
China’s welfare system. Up until now, research has by and large focused on 
describing the advances and deficiencies of the various elements of welfare, 
with due attention given to China’s large social, demographic and geographic 
variety. The effects of pre-reform arrangements and economic transition have 
featured prominently in this research. Now that the various elements of welfare 
such as healthcare, education and unemployment and pension assistance have 
been scrutinized, a logical step would be to holistically research the functioning 
of the whole welfare system. This would provide valuable opportunities for 
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improving the administration and organization of welfare systems. Due to the 
inherent constraints of research and the heterogeneity of resources and 
demands, such research ought to be conducted on the sub-national level. This 
also corresponds to the incremental approach in welfare development taken by 
the government.  
Another interesting area for research pertains to the relationship between 
welfare and political and economic objectives. Political considerations have 
featured prominently in welfare reforms. In the contest for economic 
development the state has redefined its relationship with society. Yet, the 
communist social contract, in which equality is prominent, still dominates many 
Chinese’s perception of the responsibilities of the state (Hurst and O’Brien 
2002). Economic development has brought about greater disparity and as such 
has served to exacerbate the sentiment that the government has reneged on its 
obligations. 
Notwithstanding that economic development initially engenders greater 
inequality, it is important to remember that the prioritization of either efficiency 
or equality is a choice. The renewed concern for the provision of a ubiquitous 
standard of living thus may well herald the beginning of a more egalitarian 
society. After all, the one thing that cannot be denied sixty years after the 
establishment of the People’s Republic is the capacity of the Chinese state to 
engender change. 
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